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Country Profile

# Brazil

September 1973

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY

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# Country Profile: BRAZIL

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## The Future Seems Closer

Brazil, long dismissed as "the country of the future—not now!" has amazed friends and critics alike by emerging on the international scene with the boast that "the takeoff is now." The authoritarian military-backed administrations that have governed since the military coup in 1964 have achieved general political stability through an imposed political consensus and have proceeded to bring off something of an economic miracle—reducing rampant inflation from an annual rate of about 140% in the first quarter of 1964 to 15% in 1972. Moreover, they have spurred the economy to a dynamic growth rate that has been sustained at more than 9% per year since 1967, resulting in a gross national product that now reaches \$42 billion—almost half that of Canada. With industrial expansion leading the way, selected Brazilian manufactures from shoes to automobiles have entered the world market and are beginning to compete favorably with the products of Europe, Japan, and the United States. A growing number of manufacturers from these countries are establishing plants in Brazil to take advantage of favorable economic factors such as abundant resources, investment incentives, and an expanding domestic market. Some observers liken the Brazil of today to Japan a dozen years ago; others, however, see Brazil as a small Japan in economic ability within a giant India in terms of the problems of an underdeveloped society. (U/OU)

Modernization and industrialization have occurred primarily in southeastern states, which comprise only a small part of Brazil's enormous land area, and the distribution of the benefits has been unequal among regions as well as among socio-economic groups. The economic expansion is based largely on capital intensive rather than labor intensive forms of development, and unemployment and underemployment remain serious problems. Nevertheless, statistically, the number of new jobs created each year is coming close to keeping pace with the number of new entrants to the labor market. The population has reached 100 million and is growing at the rate of nearly 3% per

year, one of the world's higher growth rates. The relative proportion of young people in the overall population also continues to grow, with the result that the increasingly heavy demands on the government for education are beyond its present capabilities. The high illiteracy rate (nearly 35%) complicates the employment problem, since modern industries require literate, skilled workers and have no place for unskilled workers. Yet millions of impoverished peasants have left the countryside for the cities lured by expectations of good jobs and a better life. As a result of this population movement, since the mid-1960's Brazil has had an urban majority as well as all the related problems. (U/OU)

The distribution of population on the land is far from uniform. More than 90% of the population is concentrated on one-third of the national territory located within 300 miles of the coast. The average population density on the remaining two-thirds of the territory is 13 persons per square mile, and over the greater part of the interior it drops to less than 3 persons per square mile. (U/OU)

Of the five major regions of Brazil, the main urban centers are located in the South and Southeast—in the subtropical and temperate parts of the country. The principal industrial urban complex embraces major parts of the states of Sao Paulo, Guanabara, Rio de Janeiro, and Minas Gerais, and important secondary centers in the older parts of the three southernmost states—Rio Grande de Sul, Santa Catarina, and Parana. The South and Southeast have the most highly developed economic infrastructure in the country; they dominate industrial production, and lead in modern commercial agriculture. (U/OU)

The Northeast, the other region with zones of dense population, is overpopulated in terms of its level of technology and economic development, and it is the principal source area for out-migration to the large industrial centers in the Southeast. The Northeast Region has a meager natural resource base and is handicapped by the dominance of a system of inefficient sugar monoculture in the humid coastal zone and by the periodic recurrence of calamitous droughts in the semiarid backlands. (U/OU)

The existence of vast tracts of sparsely populated land in the interior leads many to assume, erroneously, that only inertia stands in the way of settling great numbers of people on the land and transforming it into a huge breadbasket. The interior lands include the wet/dry savannas of the Central-West Region, devoted mainly to open-range cattle grazing; the thornbush-covered backlands of the semiarid Northeast, used precariously for open-range grazing, subsistence farming, and tree cotton cultivation; and

the vast tropical forests of the Amazon Basin, large areas of which are peopled only by scattered rubber gatherers, prospectors, subsistence farmers, and the last remaining primitive forest Indian tribes. These tropical ecosystems—rain forest, savanna, and thornbush—are fragile and, for the most part, are not amenable to widespread agricultural settlement based on traditional (low capital input) farming practices. Many areas have considerable potential for agricultural development, however, provided that modern management practices are introduced and requisite large capital investments are made for basic infrastructure and technological support. Rich mineral deposits have been discovered in the interior, but they, too, will require large capital investments for development. (U/OU)

Although the government is conscious of the unequal distribution of national income between regions and between socio-economic groups, it has chosen to promote growth today and tackle distribution tomorrow, on the old assumption that there is not much point in slicing the cake into smaller slices unless you can bake a bigger cake. The government has, however, launched a National Integration Program as a starter to reduce regional disparities and promote the rapid integration of the North and the Northeast with the national economy. It is not immediately concerned with the population explosion per se and tends to think of rapid population growth as useful to economic development—to provide a wider market for industrial goods and settlers for colonization of the interior. A large population is equated with national greatness. (U/OU)

Brazilian society is multiracial and exhibits noticeable regional and class distinctions; nevertheless, a remarkable homogeneous national culture has evolved. There is a strong and deep feeling among Brazilians that they form a "people" and a nation. They share common ideals, common tastes, common problems, common heroes, a common past, and a common sense of humor. Everyone celebrates the pre-Lenten carnival, and most seem to regard it as a uniquely Brazilian festival; Independence Day (7 September) is honored throughout the land; and the internationally recognized Pele, the young Negro who led Brazil to its first victory in the world soccer championship in 1958, is revered as a national hero. Nearly all Brazilians speak Portuguese, regardless of national origin, and more than 90% profess Catholicism, although their religion is tempered with African, Amerindian, and spiritualist elements. The Brazilian culture is basically a modified Lusitanian culture. As if to compensate for the brevity of its own history, Brazil has adopted wholeheartedly the Lusitanian traditions



and history that link Portugal to the pre-Roman era. African and American Indian traits have certainly survived and contributed much to Brazilian national culture; but, rather than forming a cultural mosaic, the African and Amerindian traits were absorbed by the Luso-Brazilian culture. The Indian taught the Portuguese settler how to live in the New World, how to eat strange new foods, and cultivate new crops. The Brazilian vocabulary is sprinkled with words of Tupi-Guarani origin—applied particularly to animals, plants, and places. The African influence is felt most strongly in aspects of family life, for in the formative period of Brazilian culture the African was the cook, nursemaid, servant, playmate, storyteller, and sexual partner of the European. The formal institutions of government, education, religion, and economics as

well as the language and the basic ideal patterns of behavior constitute the Lusitanian legacy. Many of the traditional attitudes and ideals were shaped for an agrarian society and seem to have been grounded in the code of the landed gentry. The strong preference for gentlemanly occupations, for example, appears ingrained, although unattainable for most. As soon as underprivileged groups move upward into the middle class through added education and income, they seek white-collar jobs and tend to look down on manual labor. These and other attitudes and values appear largely out of keeping with the dynamic metropolitan centers of modern Brazil; yet they have shown remarkable stability and they persist, although reinterpreted, despite rapid economic and social change. (U/OU)

### Emergence and Development of the Republic (c)

When Pedro Alvares Cabral "discovered" Brazil in 1500 and claimed it for Portugal, he not only did not know what he'd found (he thought it was an island and named it Ilha da Vera Cruz) but he did not try to find out. He stayed only long enough to renew his fleet's supply of fresh water and to repair some of the damage inflicted by the storm that had driven him so far to the west; then he sailed off to India, his original destination.

Brazil is named after a tree—the brazil or brazilwood, which yields a red or purple dye that for several years was Brazil's major export, along with a few native-made trinkets, some bright-plumaged birds, and an occasional pet monkey to amuse the ladies of the Portuguese court. Only a few tiny coastal settlements were established in Brazil during the first quarter-century of occupation. Reluctance to colonize stemmed primarily from economic considerations—the dye and the other items Brazil offered were far less attractive to traders than the spices and jewels that could be found in India and Asia.

Beyond the economic, however, was the simple fact that the land and its inhabitants frequently were hostile. The dense forests were a formidable barrier to movement and contained many fearsome dangers

never before encountered by Europeans. Furthermore, not all the Indians possessed the pacific nature that made possible the expansion of trade—many were hostile to strangers, and some were cannibals. (One of the first sailors to go ashore from the expedition of 1501 was killed and eaten by savages.) It was soon evident that the Indian would not provide the labor supply that Brazil needed, and it was equally certain that the Portuguese colonist had not come to the New World to work with his hands.

Sugar cane, introduced from the Azores, became a source of wealth for the colony in the mid-16th century, and the need for labor became acute. Portugal was already in the African slave trade, and sugar provided the motive and the wherewithal for extending the trade to Brazil. Northeastern Brazil became the world's prime source of sugar and retained this position until it lost its primacy to competition from other countries early in the 18th century.

Privateers and naval units of the French, Dutch, and British raided the Brazilian settlements and plundered the shipping between Brazil and Lisbon during the period from 1580 to 1640 when Portugal was ruled by the reigning monarchs of Spain. The English were more interested in booty than in conquest, but the



16th century artist's version of an Amazon Indian

French and the Dutch were determined to extend their empires. The French, who mounted several invasions beginning in 1530, were driven into what is now French Guiana by 1615. The Dutch, who were more successful and more persistent, were not expelled from Brazilian territory until 1654, 14 years after the restoration of Portuguese independence.

During the second half of the 17th century and the beginning of the 18th, gold and diamonds were discovered in Mato Grosso, Minas Gerais, and Goias. The ensuing gold rush was one of the richest in history, but by the beginning of the 19th century, as production costs increased, gold production was limited to only a few areas, and the hordes of eager but inefficient amateur prospectors had long since disappeared.

A spirit of independence discerned in Brazilians of the 18th century was manifested openly in an abortive revolt in 1789, the first of a series of independence movements. The political pot continued to simmer—sporadically boiling up and subsiding—for the next 33 years. In 1822, Prince Pedro—whose father, Portuguese King Joao VI, had appointed him regent to govern Brazil—placed himself in the forefront of the movement for independence and proclaimed himself Pedro I, Emperor of Brazil.

From the outset the new nation suffered a number of difficulties, for the most part centering around the question of the relative degrees of political power to be exercised by the emperor and the representatives of the people. Furthermore, Dom Pedro I had the bad luck to be faced with a vigorous, but unsuccessful, secession movement in the north; to lose the Bauda Oriental (today Uruguay) to Argentina; and have the public learn that he was somewhat unflatteringly unorthodox in his marital relations. In 1831 he threw it all over and abdicated in favor of his 5-year old son, with the chores of governing falling to regents.

Almost 10 years of government by regents failed to unify the country. To prevent further chaos the young Pedro, only 14 years old, was declared of age in 1840 and proclaimed Dom Pedro II, constitutional Emperor of Brazil. He reigned ably for the next 49 years, bringing about the internal pacification and consolidation of the country and scoring a number of diplomatic achievements that bolstered Brazil's prestige abroad. He encouraged immigration and promoted the construction of railroads and the expansion of agriculture, industry, and commerce. His own keen interest in scientific and technological progress stimulated the intellectual and cultural development of the whole country.

Dom Pedro's long and beneficent reign came to an end in 1889, partly because the monarchy had aroused the enmity of the plantation owners by emancipating

all their slaves without compensation and partly because the concept of a monarchy, whatever its virtues, had become outmoded. Dom Pedro himself had taught his subjects to seek that which was new and disdain that which was old, and so they did. Deposed by a bloodless *coup d'etat*, the emperor and his family quietly left the country, which had overnight become a republic.

As sugar and gold had dominated the economy in the 17th and 18th centuries, respectively, coffee provided the impetus for economic development in the 19th century and early 20th century. The coffee boom attracted an influx of immigrants, mainly from Europe, and cultivation expanded rapidly within the Southeast—particularly in Sao Paulo. Exploitative cultivation practices induced both soil exhaustion and erosion, and the coffee frontier moved continually westward into virgin areas as farmers abandoned old lands in search of new. In the process, the settlement of Sao Paulo state was largely accomplished, and the wealth accumulated from coffee production permitted the creation of a general economic structure favorable for industrial-urban development. By the end of the 19th century the city of Sao Paulo had become the financial and industrial center of Brazil.

The 50 years from 1870 to 1920 saw the country caught up in a frenzy of growth and modernization. The population trebled; the national territory was enlarged by conquest, purchase, and arbitration, and change was the order of the day. A new constitution enhanced the authority of the states at the expense of the central government, and the locus of political power shifted permanently to the Southeast. A new class of wealthy industrialists emerged and competed with the landed elite for position and political influence.

A number of remarkable statesmen guided the course of the republic toward political unity, economic expansion, and social modernization. The majority of the presidents were civilians, constitutionally elected, until 1930 when, because of political unrest and revolutionary activity, the military stepped in and put Getulio Vargas in power. Vargas became known as "Father of the Poor" for the social measures he introduced. Although the army forced him to relinquish executive powers in 1945, he returned 5 years later as elected President. In 1954, however, the military seemed bent on forcing him out again; it accused him of corruption, and Vargas committed suicide before the investigation was complete.

The most remarkable surge of economic growth yet recorded in Brazil occurred during the 5-year administration of Juscelino Kubitschek, who took office in January 1956. He campaigned on the slogan "Fifty



*Modern photographer's depiction of the real thing*

Years of Progress in Five" and, once elected, called for vast inputs of domestic and foreign capital to achieve expansion of private as well as public investment. Kubitschek's audacity and confidence—as revealed in his concept of Brasilia—captured the imagination of the Brazilian people, a factor which contributed to the success of his economic program and the aura of political stability which accompanied it.

The material accomplishments of the Kubitschek administration cannot be refuted, but the price of progress was high and, for the most part, not realized until after Kubitschek had left office. Under Kubitschek, the illusion of prosperity was maintained in part by frequent issuances of new money, which contributed to steady inflation and a threefold increase in the cost of living between 1955 and 1960. At the same time, the lavish expenditures of funds on crash projects seemed to encourage an unusual degree of corruption and inefficiency in public office at all levels. Furthermore, Kubitschek's heavy foreign borrowings imposed a schedule of debt repayments that was to plague his successors.

The so-called "March to the West" will probably stand as Kubitschek's legacy to Brazil. Although the establishment of a national capital in the interior had been authorized and under consideration for years, it was President Kubitschek who turned the law and the vague plans into reality. Brasilia became the symbol of Brazil's commitment to the development of the west. Construction of the city was a tremendous undertaking in terms of engineering and logistics as well as physical labor, and economic cost, and the daring city plan and architectural design gave expression to a growing self-confidence and pride in Brazilian society and its potential. To complete the official move of the national capital to Brasilia by April 1960, trunk roads were rushed to completion connecting Brasilia with Sao Paulo, Belo Horizonte, and Belem (at the mouth of the Amazon)—major undertakings in themselves. Many may question the wisdom of the great Brasilia effort, but the people are proud of the recordbreaking construction of a city in the wilderness in 3 years.

Janio Quadros, a self-styled reform candidate, won the Presidency in 1960 but after encountering various difficulties, resigned unexpectedly after 7 months on the job. Vice-President Joao Goulart succeeded Quadros, but over military protests. A parliamentary system of government was introduced to curb Goulart's powers, but Goulart by political maneuvering achieved a restoration of the presidential system by national plebiscite in 1963. Under Goulart the cost of living rose 300%, the exchange rate was devalued about 85%, and Brazil's foreign debt increased astronomically. In the face of this crisis, Goulart turn-

*Capital city of Brasilia*



ed to the leftists for support and resorted increasingly to nationalistic demagoguery in appeals for popular backing. His leftist drift and chaotic policies led the military, with broad civilian support, to oust him from office on 2 April 1964.

Humberto Castello Branco, a highly respected army general who had played a leading role in the Goulart overthrow, was endorsed by a weak postrevolution Congress to serve for the remainder of Goulart's term—extended by Congress to 15 March 1967. Castello Branco gave highest priorities to the government's early efforts on checking subversion and eliminating corruption. Several hundred politicians, subversives, and other persons charged with illegal activities were subjected to 10-year suspension of their political rights, and many public officials, including a substantial number of congressmen, were ousted from offices for similar reasons. Political activities by labor unions and student groups were sharply curtailed. Congress, with many of the opposition leaders purged from its ranks, generally was reluctant to resist the

regime and approved most of the significant administration bills.

Castello Branco's successor, Arthur da Costa e Silva, a retired army marshal, took office in March 1967, after having been elected President by the purged Congress in October 1966. The new Constitution approved by Congress in January 1967 was a very authoritarian document, in contrast with the 1946 version. It institutionalized many of the special powers that had been employed by Castello Branco, but the political situation deteriorated under the Costa e Silva government, and the Congress was suspended.

When President Costa e Silva suffered a stroke in August 1969, the three ministers of the armed forces assumed control of the government. The top level of the armed forces hierarchy selected Gen. Emilio Garrastazu Medici, commander of the Third Army, to succeed Costa e Silva—primarily because his selection was the least threatening to military unity. The suspension of Congress was lifted so that it could ratify the "election," and Medici took office on 30 October 1969.

Public attitudes toward the Medici government are difficult to determine because the communications media are controlled, virtually all public expression of dissent is forbidden, and most elections are not held by popular ballot. The administration has earned the support of many Brazilians through its success in promoting rapid economic growth, reducing the rate of inflation, and in pursuing national integration through the construction of transportation and communications links and the opening up of the vast Amazon region. Based on their effective economic performance, the business and financial communities, whose nexus is Sao Paulo, have been firm supporters of the post-1964 governments. On the other hand, Medici himself has publicly recognized that most workers thus far have received only slight personal


material benefits from the economic progress achieved over the past 8 years. He has said that more attention should be devoted to improving this record.

Overt political opposition is almost nil, and the most consistently defiant attitudes toward military-led governments have been found among certain university students and professors, among some middle class professionals and intellectuals, and among clergymen of the Catholic left. The only violent opposition has come from small urban terrorist groups, whose operations reached a peak in 1969. By 1972, aggressive and at times heavy handed campaigns by the security forces had severely hampered both violent and non-violent opposition groups. Many activists now have abandoned the goal of ousting the administration or even significantly affecting its policies.

Charges of repression and of police-state brutality, levied against the military government by political exiles, gained considerable international attention during the first 2 years of the Medici administration. More recently such charges are heard only occasionally and cause little reaction inside or outside of Brazil.

Thus far in its history, Brazil has experienced most of the Western forms of state organization except communism. It was a colony from 1500 to 1822, a constitutional monarchy from 1822 to 1889, a republic ruled by an oligarchy from 1889 to 1930, a dictatorship under Getulio Vargas from 1930 to 1945, and a liberal democracy from 1946 to 1964. In that year it came under the rule of the military, who continue as the sole power today despite the trappings of legality and public representation. Brazil has had several constitutions: the Imperial Constitution (1824), the Constitution of the Early Republic (1891), the first Vargas Constitution (1934), the New State Constitution (1937), the Constitution of 1946, and now the Military "Constitution" of 1967, modified in 1969.

## Economic Plans, Potential, and Prospects (c)



*Sao Paulo, Brazil's largest city and economic growth center*

Late in 1971, President Medici announced an economic development plan to be implemented during his last 3 years in office, 1972-74. The plan was designed to continue the nation's rate of economic growth, double the per capita income by 1980, and make Brazil a fully developed industrial nation within a generation. Special attention was to go to the problems of illiteracy, backward agriculture, and uneven distribution of income. The plan had specific provision for combined public and private investments of \$800 million each year to develop the Northeast and the Amazon Basin. Steel, petrochemicals, shipbuilding, and highway construction were to be expanded, along with electric power, communications, and the mining industry. In addition, the plan called for large-scale production of atomic fuels for the country's first nuclear powerplant.

Brazil's natural resource base, if properly managed, is certainly adequate to support its economic development program; in fact, the store of untapped resources may well be unsurpassed anywhere. Iron ore deposits, in particular, are extensive and support basic industries as well as provide a major export commodity. The principal natural resource deficiencies are in basic mineral fuels—coal and petroleum. Brazil has, however, a large hydroelectric power potential, and its ambitious electric power expansion program relies heavily on hydraulic sources through the 1970's with some increase in thermal generation. Proven uranium reserves are limited, but there is an active uranium prospecting program. The first nuclear powerplant is scheduled for testing and operation in 1976, and, after 1985, plans call for a notable increase in nuclear power generation.

The overall government investment in basic infrastructure has been impressive. As with expansion of the power network, the telephone and telex systems have been greatly expanded and improved, and an ambitious highway construction program has more than doubled the total length of paved roads in the country between 1963 and 1971. The most spectacular undertaking, perhaps, has been the penetration of all-weather trunk roads far into the Amazonian interior.

There is a large, relatively sophisticated industrial base in Brazil ranging from basic industries such as steel, chemicals, and petrochemicals to finished consumer goods. New industrial plants are springing up very rapidly, but booming exports and the increase in local demand are keeping unused capacity to a minimum and helping to achieve economies of scale. In contrast with world trends, steel consumption in Brazil soared by 30% in 1971, and steel production increased 11.5%. An ambitious steel expansion program is designed to meet the economy's soaring demand, reduce imports, and effectively use the country's vast reserves of high-grade iron ore. Brazil produces more automotive vehicles than the rest of Latin America combined, and some manufacturers are successfully entering the export market. Two new petrochemical complexes were opened in Sao Paulo and Bahia in 1971, and Brazilians are saying that the 1970's will be the golden age of petrochemicals as the 1960's were the boom period for automobiles. The internal market for petrochemicals is continually expanding, particularly for synthetic rubber for use in tires. Producers of wood products have been unable to keep up with the local demand for timber and cellulose, and, although timber reserves are great, it is going to be difficult to guarantee supply without disturbing the natural tree-growth cycle. As the reserves of Parana pine diminish, many producers in the South and Southeast regions are turning to fast-growing eucalyptus as a substitute for pine in making pulp. In the North, the D.K. Ludwig enterprise has leveled thousands of acres of rain forest on its holdings and replanted with 17 million *Gmelina aborea* seedlings—a fast-growing south Asian tree that is an excellent source of paper pulp. Statistically, perhaps the most dramatic Brazilian industrial advance has been in the manufacture of shoes—the value of export trade in shoes increased from \$450,000 in 1967 to \$23,500,000 in 1971. However, with 80% of the shoe exports destined for the U.S. market, manufacturers are wary that the U.S. Congress may further restrict access to the American market. Brazil's electronics industry is also growing, although it is troubled by idle productive capacity stemming from many small-scale operations. Finally,

the Brazilian shipbuilding industry has been given a tremendous stimulus from the government's plan to increase the size of its merchant fleet from nearly 2,400,000 deadweight tons to 5,000,000 tons in 1975.

The record of husbanding Brazil's agricultural resources has not been particularly good. Only about 3% of the land is now used for crop cultivation. Cultivable land is located mainly in the eastern part of the country, and many of the soils have suffered serious depletion and erosion from destructive agricultural practices over prolonged periods of time. These soils, nevertheless, respond well to good management techniques and, in general, represent the country's best soil types. Sao Paulo has led the way in rehabilitating land and introducing modern farming techniques to increase food production for a growing urban market. The southernmost states have greatly expanded the modern commercial cultivation of rice, wheat, and soybeans. Output and exports of soybeans, in particular, have been skyrocketing, and Brazil has become the United States' only important competitor in the world soybean market. Coffee remains the principal export crop, but soybeans may rival this position in a few years. Sugar, cotton, and cacao are important secondary export crops.

One area that is a special case in terms of the need for agricultural reform is the Northeast. Here the most productive land is in the humid coastal zone, which is devoted almost exclusively to sugar cane, with little acreage devoted to food crops. The land, held in large units by a wealthy oligarchy, is used inefficiently. Large numbers of landless peasants are underemployed or work for very low wages under conditions approaching serfdom. In the backlands a combination of open-range cattle raising, cotton growing, and subsistence farming support the rural population at only a marginal level under normal conditions. When prolonged droughts occur, the meager reserves of the peasant families cannot sustain them, and thousands then abandon their homes and join the trek of "flagelados" (the afflicted ones) to the coast. Although many return to the land when the drought is broken by rains large numbers remain in the regional urban centers or proceed to the large industrial centers in the Southeast.

The government has attempted to deal with the complex problem through several programs: a program of fiscal incentives promoting industrial development in the Northeast; a program of restructuring and modernizing the sugar industry; several projects to increase water supply and expand irrigation agriculture; a land reform program to redistribute land and to finance agroindustry, subsidize agricultural production, expand agricultural research, and improve the



*Drought in the Northeast.*

marketing infrastructure; and, finally, the ambitious National Integration Program, which seeks to transfer excess population from the Northeast to Amazonia through the colonization of new lands.

The government can point to various successes stemming from these initiatives. Many new industries have located in the region, primarily in Salvador and Recife, and have added a very sizable input to the regional economy. But this expansion of capital-intensive in-

dustries is not solving the immediate problem of providing jobs for the large numbers of unskilled *Nordestinos* who have migrated to the urban centers.

The planned irrigation schemes should eventually have considerable impact on localized areas—particularly the Rio Sao Francisco valley. Surveys do not, however, reveal sufficient water resources and land suitable for irrigation to favor any large-scale expansion in the Northeast.

Little has been accomplished to date in the programs for land reform and rationalization of the sugar industry. The government has authorized the expenditure of about \$30 million in 1973 specifically for land distribution, and is showing greater determination in carrying out the land reform program. The greatest need for land reform is within the sugar zone, and it is there that critics anticipate the least accomplishment. This may be due, in part, to differing interests of the Sugar and Alcohol Institute, which is responsible for modernizing the sugar industry, and the National Institute for Colonization and Land Reform (INCRA), which is responsible for implementing the land reform program.

Initially, the National Integration Program was introduced as a solution to the problem of unemployment and excess population in the Northeast. It became increasingly apparent that, although important in the long run for national development, it would not have any appreciable short-term impact on the Northeast. Laborers from the Northeast were employed on road construction in Amazonia, but INCRA soon discovered that many had no farming background, and few had any intention of remaining in Amazonia after completing their job. INCRA then sought to recruit literate, experienced, and progressive farmers from the Northeast, but was unable to find enough qualified applicants to fill the quotas. The search for prospective colonists was then expanded to all of Brazil, although stress was still placed on finding as many as possible in the Northeast.



## Toward Cohesion Within and A Voice Abroad (c)


The degree of success in carrying out the National Integration Program will provide some measure of the government's intent and capability to eliminate the extreme regional disparities in economic development. The nation's readiness to leap into vast projects such as this indicates boldness of vision and a willingness to accept risks; however, it may also indicate a lack of caution and a tendency to underestimate the magnitude of the task ahead or its probable economic and social costs. The National Integration Program is a high-priority integrated plan that seeks to implant a viable agriculture-based society in the areas of Amazonia selected for colonization. It capitalizes on the dramatic success of the Belem-Brasilia Highway in stimulating settlement and trade in eastern Amazonia, but attempts to avoid the chaotic situation resulting from spontaneous settlement along that route. It couples the construction of major penetration roads with controlled colonization of the land along the routes, and it includes the financing of infrastructure projects needed to support the colonization effort.

The planned road network, a colossal 10,000 miles in extent, includes as key elements the east-west Trans-Amazonian Highway and the north-south Cuiaba-Santarem Highway. Other roads will extend from these trunk highways to the borders of neighboring countries along the periphery of the Amazon Basin. The highway network is intended to open vast areas to settlement and trade, link them to established road networks in the east and south, and supplement the Amazon network of natural waterways. Highway construction is progressing nearly on schedule although there have been many problems. Heavy equipment, for example, becomes immobilized during the height of the rainy season, and, therefore, road crews must work around the clock during the dry season to meet deadlines. Initially, most of the roads will have only a gravel surface, temporary wooden bridges over the smaller streams, and ferries on the large rivers. If the intensity of traffic generated by the roads is sufficient to warrant improvements in design standards, all or segments of the roads will be paved, and permanent bridge structures will be added. Meanwhile, the task of

maintaining such an extensive network of unpaved roads against the ravages of the rainy seasons is formidable and costly.

Although the government's ability to construct the highways has been demonstrated, its ability to successfully carry out the colonization effort is yet to be proved. INCRA has the task of selecting, moving, and establishing 100,000 families (500,000 persons) on homestead plots along the highways by June 1975. The colonists are settled in farm villages, *agrovilas*, spaced 3 to 6 miles apart. INCRA provides each family a small wooden house and provisional title to a 250-acre plot near the village. Five acres of land are cleared for each farmer, and he is given seeds, tools, and technical orientation, enabling him to plant a first subsistence crop. He is also paid a minimum salary for

*Trans-Amazonian Highway*





*Present-day pioneers in agrovila*

5 months. At the end of this period he is essentially on his own, although he is guaranteed minimum crop prices for 2 years.

Each *agrovila*, consisting of about 50 family dwellings, is to have a few basic services. A larger center, an *agropolis*, will provide additional services to each group of 20 *agrovilas*, and a still larger center, the *ruropolis*, will serve clusters of three or four *agropoles*. Given adequate funds to carry it out, the design of the colonization program is practical. The settling of colonists in *agrovilas* supported by a well-spaced network of larger centers should greatly facilitate establishing and administering public services. Although INCRA attempts to select colonists with farm experience, personal initiative, and a reputation for hard work, the adequacy of the technical guidance provided the colonists may well spell the success or failure of the settlement program. Whether from the Northeast or the South, the colonists are unaccustomed to the Amazonian environment and must be taught how to cope with an excess of water, unknown plant diseases and pests, different planting/harvesting schedules, and modern land management techniques adapted to

the region. Traditional slash-and-burn agriculture is ingrained in the Brazilian subsistence farmer as part of his cultural heritage, and his ways may be difficult to change unless agricultural extension assistance is provided over an extended period. INCRA officials are conducting initial technical orientation for the colonists, and agricultural extension facilities are planned for the larger centers; however, critics question the capability of the Ministry of Agriculture to man and support a wide network of extension service posts on a continuing basis.

The funds originally projected for the colonization part of the National Integration Plan appear inadequate to finance the infrastructure required, and the business sector has shown little inclination to invest in *agrovilas* or to open access roads. It has invested in large-scale agricultural and livestock projects—ones that are labor extensive. The government may, of course, make additional resource commitments, since the program has captured the public imagination and appeals to national pride. To allow the program to fail, considering the tremendous momentum gained, could be politically imprudent.

Various observers argue that the large sums being invested in industry in the Northeast and settlement in Amazonia could, on balance, be more profitably invested on the nation's behalf in the economically dynamic Southeast and South. Regional rivalry is strong and remains an impediment to national cohesion. The present extreme centralization of political and economic power in the hands of the federal executive branch of government has greatly weakened the influence and power of the states. And the armed forces view themselves as a uniquely national institution, particularly well suited to further national rather than sectional interests.

The solid political and economic progress made since the military overthrow of the chaotic Goulart regime has given the government sufficient strength and confidence in itself to pay increasing attention to foreign affairs. The Medici administration's basic foreign goals include protecting national integrity (territory, resources, economy) from foreign domination or undue influence, achieving a voice in hemispheric affairs second only to that of the United States, and—ultimately—achieving recognition as a power to be reckoned with in world councils.

Visible signs of this attention to foreign relations have been Medici's trip to Washington, December 1971, and the frequent travels and contacts of Foreign Minister Gibson Barboza. The latter has visited or

hosted the foreign ministers of most South and Central American countries, as well as those of several countries in the Caribbean, Africa, and the Middle East. A principal aim of the diplomatic activity is to strengthen Brazil's position as a spokesman—especially on economic issues—for the developing world. Brazil is increasingly using the United Nations and the Organization of American States as effective stages to present themes such as the need for developing countries to have a role in the reformulation of the international monetary system, in changing the structure of world trade, and in the construction of a global disarmament program that will channel economic resources thus freed to developing nations. Brazil's representatives in multilateral economic bodies such as the International Coffee Organization are also promoting the country's interests, which are often in opposition to those of the developed nations that are the world's major consumers of raw materials. Brazil is also taking a position of leadership among Latin American countries claiming a 200-mile territorial sea limit, thus challenging the U.S. position.

These limited ventures into the world power politics could, if they are pressed too far or too hastily, raise uneasiness concerning the ambitions of the giant of South America. Nevertheless, Brazilians are encouraged by what they view as the growing world prestige of their country.

## Chronology (u/ou)

1500

April

Portuguese, under command of Pedro Alvares Cabral, reach coastal areas of Brazil.

1808

Pushed out by Napoleonic invasion, prince regent Dom Joao moves seat of Portuguese Empire to Rio de Janeiro.

1822

September

Prince regent Dom Pedro proclaims Brazilian independence in defiance of Portuguese parliament's desire to restore colonial status.

December

Dom Pedro I is crowned Emperor of Brazil.

1823-24

Portuguese garrisons are forced to return to Europe, and Brazilian independence is gradually consolidated; United States is first nation to recognize new government.

1823-28

Wars with Argentina result in loss of territory which is present-day Uruguay.

1831-40

Dom Pedro, at odds with parliament, abdicates in favor of 5-year old son. Period of regency is marked by civil distress. Parliament brings Dom Pedro II to throne at age 14.

1864-70

Brazil joins Argentina and Uruguay in war against Paraguay; annexes territory north of Rio Apa.

1888

Although slave trade had been abolished in 1831, "Golden Law" finally ends slavery by decreeing complete emancipation without compensation to owners.

1889

November

Revolt of part of army brings about collapse of Empire; Dom Pedro formally abdicates and is banished with family to Europe; Brazil is declared a Republic.

1930

November

Vargas seizes power after a revolt; as provisional President, sets in motion consolidation of central power, extensive economic and social change.

1934

July

Constituent Assembly drafts new Constitution and elects Vargas President.

1937

November

Calling off pending election, Vargas sets aside 1934 Constitution and substitutes New State (*Estado Novo*) which allows him to rule by decree.

1942

August

Brazil declares war on Germany and Italy, collaborates with the United States in hemisphere defense, and sends troops and combat aircraft to Europe—the only South American nation to do so.

1945

October

Vargas is forced to resign by group of army officers; Chief Justice heads interim government.

December

Gen. Eurico Gaspar Dutra is elected President by large majority of popular vote.

1946

September

New Constitution is promulgated after 6-month constitutional convention; multiparty system which had been in operation since Vargas overthrow is confirmed.

1947

May

Communist Party is outlawed as undemocratic, foreign-based organization.

October

Brazil breaks relations with the U.S.S.R.

1951

January

Vargas is again inaugurated President after substantial victory in October 1950 elections.

1954

August

Vargas' henchmen murder air force officer in attempted assassination of opposition newspaper editor Carlos Lacerda; accused of corruption by the military, Vargas commits suicide before investigation is completed. Vice President serves out Vargas' term.

1956

January

Juscelino Kubitschek is inaugurated President, Joao Goulart Vice President.

1960

April

Capital is moved to Brasilia.

**1961****January**

Janio Quadros is inaugurated President, Joao Goulart Vice President.

**August-September**

Quadros resigns, blaming domestic and foreign pressures; succession of proleftist Goulart is opposed by many within military. Compromise by Congress permits Goulart to take office but Constitution is amended to introduce parliamentary government and President is stripped of important powers.

**November**

Relations with the U.S.S.R. restored.

**1963****January**

Goulart-engineered plebiscite restores presidential system and full power to Goulart.

**1964****March-April**

Goulart is ousted by military-civilian coalition led by Gen. Humberto Castello Branco, due to conviction that Goulart, who had Communist and other ultraleftist supporters, was drifting toward economic catastrophe and dictatorship, possibly under Communist domination. Supreme Revolutionary Command issues Institutional Act: executive is given extraordinary powers, certain civil rights are suspended, and many politicians and military personnel are purged. Castello Branco, elected by Congress to serve out Goulart's term, retires from army and takes office on 15 April.

**May**

Diplomatic relations with Cuba are broken over Cuban support of Brazilian insurgents.

**1965****April**

Brazil contributes forces to Inter-American Peace Force in Dominican Republic crisis.

**October**

Institutional Act Number Two abolishes all political parties, lays basis for reorganizing political system around pro-government ARENA and opposition MDB.

**1966****September**

Progovernment candidates win all contested gubernatorial elections.

**October**

Retired Army Marshal Arthur da Costa e Silva is elected President by Congress.

**November**

ARENA party maintains its majorities in congressional elections.

**1967****January**

Government promulgates new Constitution incorporating Institutional Acts of Castello Branco administration

**March**

President Costa e Silva decrees sweeping National Security Law, which authorizes trial by military courts for accused subversives.

**1968****March-July**

Large-scale student demonstrations plague major cities, underscoring popular dissatisfaction with government.

**May**

Some 68 municipalities are declared "of interest to national security," thereby losing their right to elect municipal officials.

**October**

Renewed student demonstrations, urban terrorism increase pressure on government from military rightwing for corrective action.

**December**

Congressional refusal to permit trial of opposition deputy provokes authoritarian reaction. President issues Institutional Act Number Five, giving him dictatorial powers; Congress is dismissed; many opponents of regime are arrested and deprived of political rights, habeas corpus and many other civil rights are suspended.

**1969****January-August**

Purges continue at national and state levels; six more Institutional Acts: strict role of judiciary, suspend elections, and increase punitive powers of state. Urban terrorism increases.

**August**

Costa e Silva has stroke; triumvirate of military ministers takes power in his name.

**September**

U.S. Army Major Elbrick is kidnapped by terrorists who negotiate release of 15 Brazilian political prisoners.

**October**

Military declare vacancy in office of President and Vice President; choose Gen. Emilio Garrastazu Medici and retired Admiral Hamann Rademaker Grunewald to fill positions; purged Congress is convoked to ratify military's choice; both take office on 30 October.

**November**

Security offensive against terrorists is accelerated; information gained by roundup of ALN activists leads to slaying of leader Carlos Marighella.

**1970**

Despite dramatic abductions of international officials (March: Japanese consul general; June: West German ambassador; December: Swiss ambassador), terrorist activities decline in face of harsh security measures (PCBR leader Mario Alves de Souza Viera is killed in January; Joaquim Camara Ferreira, successor to Marighella in ALN, in October). Excesses, however, mainly use of torture, bring government under considerable pressure from church activists and prelates, international criticism.

**March**

Medici issues decree extending territorial waters claim from 12 to 200 miles, including land, sea, and air space.

**October-November**

ARENA party triumphs in congressional and gubernatorial elections.

**1971**

**April**

Medici launches Trans-Amazon Highway project.

**June**

Navy starts enforcing ban on foreign fishing in 200-mile zone.

**September**

VPR terrorist leader Carlos Lamarca is killed by police.

**December**

Medici makes official visit to Washington.

**1972**

**April-May**

Medici sends Congress proposal to hold indirect gubernatorial elections in 1974; Congress approves proposal as constitutional amendment.

**1973**

**June**

President Medici announces he favors retired Gen. Ernesto Geisel to succeed him in March 1974.

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## Area Brief

### LAND (U/OU):

**Size:** 5,290,000 sq. mi.

**Use:** 3% cultivated, 13% pasture, 61% forest, 23% built-on area, wasteland, and other

**Land boundaries:** 8,125 mi.

### WATER (U/OU):

**Limits of territorial waters (claimed):** 200 n. mi.

**Coastline:** 4,655 mi.

### PEOPLE (U/OU):

**Population:** 101,035,000; average annual growth rate, 2.9% (1960-70)

**Ethnic divisions:** 60% white, 30% mixed, 8% Negro, 2% Indian (1960 estimate)

**Religion:** 93% Roman Catholic (nominal)

**Language:** Portuguese

**Literacy:** 67% of the population 15 years or older (1970)

**Labor force:** About 30 million in 1970 (est.); 44.2% agriculture, forestry, and fishing; 17.8% industry; 15.3% services, transportation, and communication; 8.9% commerce; 4.8% social activities; 3.9% public administration; 5.1% other

**Organized labor:** About 50% of labor force; only about 1.5 million pay dues

### GOVERNMENT (U/OU):

**Legal name:** Federative Republic of Brazil

**Type:** Federal republic; military-backed presidential regime since April 1964

**Capital:** Brasilia

**Political subdivisions:** 22 states, 4 territories, federal district (Brasilia)

**Legal system:** Based on Latin codes; dual system of courts, state and federal; constitution adopted 1967 and extensively amended in 1969; has not accepted compulsory ICJ jurisdiction

**Branches:** Strong executive with very broad powers; bicameral legislature (powers of the two bodies have been sharply reduced); 11-man Supreme Court

**Government leader:** President Emilio Garrastazu Medici

**Suffrage:** Compulsory over age 18, except illiterates and those stripped of their political rights; approximately 30 million registered voters in October 1970

**Elections:** Under 1967 Constitution, as amended in 1969, President Medici's successor to be chosen by a 505-member electoral college, composed of the members of Congress and delegates selected from the state legislatures, on 15 January 1974 and will take office in March; however, electoral college will really only ratify choice of retired Gen. Ernesto Geisel made by Medici and top military chiefs

**Voting strength (November 1970 congressional elections):** 46% ARENA, 25% MDB, 28.5% blank and void

**Political parties and leaders:** National Renewal Alliance (ARENA), progovernment, Petronio Portella, president; Brazilian Democratic Movement (MDB), opposition, Ulisses Guimaraes, president

**Communists:** Less than 12,000; 100,000 sympathizers (est.)

**Other political or pressure groups:** Excepting the military, the Catholic Church is the only active nationwide pressure

group; however, divisions within the Church often prevent it from speaking with one voice; labor and student groups have almost no influence on the government

**Member of:** FAO, GATT, IADB, IAEA, IBRD, ICAO, IHB, ILO, IMCO, IMF, ITU, LAFTA, OAS, Seabeds Committee, U.N., UNESCO, UPU, WHO, WMO

### ECONOMY (U/OU):

**GNP:** \$42.0 billion (at average official exchange rate, 1971), \$440 per capita

**Food:** Self-sufficient in most staple foods except wheat; a large portion of the population has an inadequate diet

**Main industries:** Food processing, beverages, tobacco, textiles, automobiles, cement, lumber, metallurgy, and machinery and equipment; has the most highly developed industrial complex in South America

**Electric power:** Capacity 13.9 million kw. (Dec. 1972); estimated production 57.3 billion kw.-hr. (1971); ranks among the five leading countries in the world in hydroelectric potential; per capita consumption 500 kw.-hr.

**Exports:** Primarily coffee; also cotton, sugar, soybeans, wood, cocoa, iron and manganese ores, and a rapidly growing number of manufactures

**Imports:** Raw materials and intermediate goods for domestic manufacturing industries, petroleum, wheat, and a broad range of capital goods

**Conversion rate:** 6.0 cruzeiros = US\$1 (March 1973) subject to small adjustments every 6 to 8 weeks

**Fiscal year:** Calendar year

### COMMUNICATIONS (C):

**Railroads:** 19,935 miles; 17,586 miles meter gage (3'3 3/4"), 2,085 miles 5'3" gage, 121 miles standard gage (4'8 1/2") and 143 miles of less than 3'3 3/4" gage, 1,621 miles electrified

**Highways:** 591,000 miles, 31,000 miles paved, 560,000 miles gravel or earth

**Inland waterways:** 31,000 miles navigable

**Pipelines:** Crude oil, 773 miles; refined products, 290 miles; natural gas, 24 miles

**Ports:** 6 major, 25 significant minor ports

**Merchant Marine:** 213 ships of 1,000 g.r.t. and over, totaling 1,609,602 g.r.t. and 2,363,393 d.w.t.

**Civil Air:** 110 major transports

**Airfields:** 2,411 usable; 8 have runways of 8,000-11,999 feet, 327 have runways of 4,000-7,999 feet; 116 have permanent surfaced runways, 375 sites, 18 seaplane stations

**Telecommunications:** Extensive and modern facilities, radio relay widely used; communications satellite ground station; nearly 2.3 million telephones; estimated 12 million radio and 7 million TV receivers; 900 AM, 150 FM, and 160 TV stations; 6 submarine cables, including 1 coaxial

### DEFENSE FORCES (U/OU):

**Military manpower:** Males 15-49, 23,080,000 (July 1973); 15,065,000 fit for military service; 1,131,000 reach military age (18) annually

**Military budget:** For fiscal year ending 31 December 1972, \$1,086 million; 18.7% of federal budget

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

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

## Places and features referred to in this General Survey (u/ou)




|                               | COORDINATES |     |    | COORDINATES |                          |     |    |     |    |                             |
|-------------------------------|-------------|-----|----|-------------|--------------------------|-----|----|-----|----|-----------------------------|
|                               | °           | 'S. | °  | 'W.         | °                        | 'S. | °  | 'W. |    |                             |
| Abuia                         | 9           | 42  | 65 | 23          | Itajaí                   | 26  | 53 | 48  | 39 | Rio Itapicuru (stream)      |
| Alagoinhas                    | 12          | 07  | 38 | 26          | Itapetininga             | 23  | 26 | 18  | 03 | Rio Jacui (stream)          |
| Alemoa                        | 23          | 56  | 46 | 22          | Itapetinga               | 15  | 15 | 40  | 15 | Rio Jaguarão (stream)       |
| Alegrete                      | 29          | 46  | 55 | 46          | Itararé                  | 24  | 07 | 49  | 20 | Rio Jequitinhonha (stream)  |
| Amazon Basin (drainage basin) | 2           | 30  | 60 | 00          | Itirapina                | 22  | 15 | 47  | 49 | Rio Largo                   |
| Amazonia (region)             | 4           | 00  | 60 | 00          | Jacarepaguá              | 22  | 55 | 43  | 21 | Rio Madeira (stream)        |
| Amazon River (stream)         | 0           | 10  | 49 | 00          | Jaguaribe                | 7   | 08 | 34  | 53 | Rio Mearim (stream)         |
| Angra dos Reis                | 23          | 00  | 44 | 18          | Japeri                   | 22  | 39 | 43  | 40 | Rio Mucuri (stream)         |
| Água Grande (oilfield)        | 12          | 22  | 38 | 21          | João Pessoa              | 7   | 07 | 34  | 52 | Rio Negro (stream)          |
| Aracaju                       | 10          | 55  | 37 | 04          | Juazeiro                 | 9   | 25 | 40  | 30 | Rio Pará (tributary)        |
| Araguari                      | 18          | 38  | 48 | 11          | Juiz de Fora             | 21  | 45 | 43  | 20 | Rio Paraguaçu (stream)      |
| Araranguá                     | 28          | 56  | 49 | 29          | Jundiaí                  | 23  | 11 | 46  | 52 | Rio Piaçuaí (stream)        |
| Araraquara                    | 21          | 47  | 48 | 10          | Jupiá (rr sta)           | 20  | 47 | 51  | 39 | Rio Paraíba (stream)        |
| Azatu                         | 12          | 49  | 38 | 27          | Ladário                  | 19  | 01 | 57  | 35 | Rio Paraíba do Sul (stream) |
| Araxá                         | 19          | 35  | 46 | 55          | Lagoa dos Patos (lagoon) | 31  | 06 | 51  | 15 | Rio Paraná (stream)         |
| Araxá                         | 4           | 57  | 37 | 08          | Lagoa Mirim              | 32  | 45 | 52  | 50 | Rio Paraopeba (stream)      |








| LATEN |                                      | COORDINATES |       |
|-------|--------------------------------------|-------------|-------|
| °     | 'W                                   | °           | 'S    |
| 8 39  | Rio Itapicuru ( <i>stream</i> )      | 2 52        | 11 12 |
| 8 03  | Rio Jacui ( <i>stream</i> )          | 30 02       | 51 15 |
| 0 15  | Rio Jaguarão ( <i>stream</i> )       | 32 39       | 53 12 |
| 9 20  | Rio Jequitinhonha ( <i>stream</i> )  | 15 51       | 38 53 |
| 7 49  | Rio Largo ( <i>stream</i> )          | 9 29        | 35 51 |
| 3 21  | Rio Madeira ( <i>stream</i> )        | 3 22        | 58 45 |
| 4 53  | Rio Mearim ( <i>stream</i> )         | 3 04        | 41 35 |
| 3 40  | Rio Mucuri ( <i>stream</i> )         | 18 05       | 39 34 |
| 4 52  | Rio Negro ( <i>stream</i> )          | 3 08        | 59 55 |
| 0 50  | Rio Pará ( <i>distributary</i> )     | 1 40        | 49 15 |
| 8 20  | Rio Paraguaná ( <i>stream</i> )      | 12 45       | 35 54 |
| 6 52  | Rio Paraguri ( <i>stream</i> )       | 27 18       | 58 38 |
| 1 39  | Rio Paraíba ( <i>stream</i> )        | 6 58        | 34 51 |
| 7 35  | Rio Paraíba do Sul ( <i>stream</i> ) | 24 37       | 41 03 |
| 1 15  | Rio Paraná ( <i>stream</i> )         | 33 43       | 59 15 |
| 2 50  | Rio Paraíba ( <i>stream</i> )        | 18 50       | 45 11 |
|       | Rio Paraíba ( <i>stream</i> )        | 15 39       | 38 57 |






**Temperature**  
**Precipitation**





22°W  
this map

Troncho  
de Nacanha



|   |       |       |                                      |       |       |
|---|-------|-------|--------------------------------------|-------|-------|
| Asunción, Paraguay                        | 25 16 | 57 40 | Lavras                               | 21 14 | 48 00 |
| Atalaia Velha                             | 10 58 | 37 04 | Lidice                               | 22 51 | 44 12 |
| Baía de Guanabara (bay)                   | 22 50 | 43 10 | Luis Correia                         | 2 53  | 41 40 |
| Bariri                                    | 22 04 | 48 44 | Maceió                               | 9 40  | 35 43 |
| Barra Bonita                              | 22 29 | 48 32 | Madre de Deus                        | 12 44 | 38 37 |
| Barra do Pirai                            | 22 28 | 43 49 | Mannaus                              | 3 08  | 60 01 |
| Barragem de Boa Esperança (dam)           | 6 43  | 43 47 | Manhuaçu                             | 20 15 | 42 02 |
| Barra Mansa                               | 22 32 | 44 11 | Mapele                               | 12 47 | 38 26 |
| Barreiro (rr sta)                         | 19 59 | 44 02 | Marcelino Ramos                      | 27 28 | 51 54 |
| Barueri                                   | 23 31 | 46 53 | Mariana                              | 20 25 | 43 25 |
| Bauru                                     | 22 19 | 49 04 | Mariante                             | 29 42 | 51 58 |
| Belém                                     | 1 27  | 48 29 | Mataripe                             | 12 41 | 38 35 |
| Belo Horizonte                            | 19 55 | 43 56 | Miranga (oilfield)                   | 12 23 | 38 11 |
| Bom Retiro do Sul                         | 29 37 | 51 56 | Mogi das Cruzes                      | 23 31 | 46 11 |
| Botelho                                   | 21 21 | 48 46 | Monte Azul                           | 15 09 | 42 53 |
| Botucatu                                  | 22 52 | 48 26 | Montevideo, Uruguay                  | 34 53 | 56 11 |
| Brasília                                  | 15 47 | 47 55 | Mossoró                              | 5 11  | 37 20 |
| Buenos Aires, Argentina                   | 34 36 | 58 27 | Mucuripe                             | 3 43  | 38 29 |
| Buracica (oilfield)                       | 12 19 | 38 24 | Natal                                | 5 47  | 35 13 |
| Cabedelo                                  | 6 58  | 34 50 | Niterói                              | 22 53 | 43 07 |
| Cabo                                      | 8 17  | 35 02 | Nova Era                             | 19 45 | 43 03 |
| Cabrália Paulista                         | 22 28 | 49 20 | Nova Iguaçu                          | 22 45 | 43 27 |
| Cacequi                                   | 29 53 | 54 49 | Oiticica                             | 5 03  | 41 05 |
| Cachimbo                                  | 8 57  | 54 54 | Olinda                               | 8 01  | 34 51 |
| Caioha (oilfield)                         | 25 42 | 48 33 | Osasco (rr sta)                      | 23 32 | 46 46 |
| Camaçari                                  | 12 36 | 38 12 | Osório                               | 29 54 | 50 16 |
| Camaquã                                   | 30 51 | 51 49 | Ouro Preto                           | 20 23 | 43 30 |
| Camocim                                   | 2 54  | 40 50 | Panorama                             | 21 21 | 51 51 |
| Campinas                                  | 22 54 | 47 05 | Paraíba do Sul                       | 22 09 | 43 17 |
| Campo Grande                              | 20 27 | 54 37 | Paranaguá                            | 25 31 | 48 30 |
| Canal de São Gonçalo (navigational canal) | 32 10 | 52 38 | Paranapiacaba                        | 23 47 | 46 19 |
| Candeias (oilfield)                       | 12 42 | 38 33 | Paso de los Libres, Argentina        | 29 43 | 57 05 |
| Capuava                                   | 23 56 | 47 58 | Paula Cavalcante (rr sta)            | 7 09  | 35 08 |
| Carmópolis                                | 10 39 | 36 59 | Paulinia                             | 22 45 | 47 10 |
| Caratinga                                 | 19 47 | 42 08 | Paulista                             | 7 57  | 34 53 |
| Catalão                                   | 18 10 | 47 57 | Paulistana                           | 8 09  | 41 09 |
| Chuí                                      | 33 41 | 53 27 | Pelotas                              | 31 46 | 52 20 |
| Colômbia                                  | 20 10 | 48 40 | Petrópolis                           | 22 31 | 43 10 |
| Congonhas                                 | 20 30 | 43 52 | Piaçabuçu                            | 10 24 | 36 25 |
| Conselheiro Lafaiete                      | 20 40 | 43 48 | Piassaguera (rr sta)                 | 23 50 | 46 23 |
| Corumbá                                   | 19 01 | 57 39 | Piedade, Serra da (ridge)            | 7 21  | 37 20 |
| Coxilha de Santa                          | 31 15 | 55 15 | Pirapora                             | 17 21 | 44 56 |
| Cubatão                                   | 23 53 | 46 25 | Pirassununga                         | 21 59 | 47 25 |
| Cuiabá                                    | 15 35 | 56 05 | Poços de Caldas                      | 21 48 | 46 34 |
| Curitiba                                  | 25 25 | 49 15 | Ponta Grossa                         | 25 05 | 50 09 |
| Diamantina                                | 18 15 | 43 36 | Portão (rr sta)                      | 25 29 | 49 18 |
| Divinópolis                               | 20 09 | 44 54 | Pôrto Alegre                         | 30 04 | 51 11 |
| Dom João (oilfield)                       | 12 37 | 38 39 | Pôrto Esperança                      | 19 37 | 57 27 |
| Doutor Joaquim Murtinho (rr sta)          | 20 33 | 43 49 | Pôrto Flores                         | 25 37 | 54 36 |
| Duque de Caxias                           | 22 47 | 43 18 | Pôrto Mendes                         | 24 30 | 54 20 |
| Engenheiro Bley                           | 25 37 | 49 45 | Pôrto Passagem (rr sta)              | 21 01 | 48 09 |
| Entroneamento                             | 29 51 | 54 56 | Pôrto Real do Colégio                | 10 11 | 36 49 |
| Exu                                       | 7 31  | 39 43 | Pôrto União                          | 26 15 | 51 05 |
| Fernandes Pinheiro                        | 22 04 | 43 13 | Pôrto Velho                          | 8 46  | 63 54 |
| Ferrugem (rr sta)                         | 19 57 | 44 01 | Pôrto Xavier                         | 27 54 | 55 08 |
| Florianópolis                             | 27 35 | 48 34 | Presidente Epitácio                  | 21 46 | 52 06 |
| Fortaleza                                 | 3 43  | 38 30 | Propriá                              | 10 13 | 36 51 |
| Foz do Iguaçu                             | 25 33 | 54 35 | Promissão (dam)                      | 21 06 | 50 10 |
| Garças de Minas (rr sta)                  | 20 11 | 45 40 | Quaraí                               | 30 23 | 56 27 |
| General Luz (rr sta)                      | 29 55 | 51 22 | Recife                               | 8 03  | 34 54 |
| Goiânia                                   | 16 40 | 49 16 | Recôncavo (basin)                    | 12 29 | 38 13 |
| Guara                                     | 24 04 | 54 15 | Recreio                              | 21 32 | 42 28 |
| Guaratinguetá                             | 22 49 | 45 13 | Resende                              | 22 28 | 44 27 |
| Guarulhos                                 | 23 28 | 46 32 | Ribeira                              | 24 40 | 49 01 |
| Horto Florestal (rr sta)                  | 19 55 | 43 55 | Rincão                               | 21 35 | 48 05 |
| Ibirapera                                 | 22 49 | 50 06 | Rio Açu (stream)                     | 5 06  | 56 40 |
| Ibitinga                                  | 21 45 | 48 59 | Rio Araguaia (stream)                | 1 15N | 49 55 |
| Ilha d'Água (isl)                         | 22 49 | 43 10 | Rio Branco, Uruguay                  | 32 34 | 53 25 |
| Ilha do Barnabé (isl)                     | 23 55 | 46 20 | Rio de Janeiro                       | 22 54 | 43 14 |
| Ilha do Governador (isl)                  | 22 48 | 43 12 | Río de la Plata, Argentina (estuary) | 35 00 | 57 00 |
| Ilheus                                    | 14 49 | 39 03 | Rio Doce (stream)                    | 19 37 | 39 49 |
| Imbituba                                  | 28 14 | 48 40 | Rio Grande                           | 32 02 | 52 05 |
| Ipanema, Praia de                         | 22 59 | 43 12 | Rio Guaíba (estuary)                 | 30 15 | 51 12 |
| Iperó                                     | 23 21 | 47 41 | Rio Gurupi (stream)                  | 1 13  | 46 06 |
| Itabaiana                                 | 7 20  | 35 20 | Rio Ibiçui (stream)                  | 29 25 | 56 47 |
| Itabora                                   | 19 37 | 43 13 | Rio Itajá (stream)                   | 26 54 | 48 33 |

Cerro d  
Pasco


**Lima**

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